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INTRODUCTION
During the jurors’ deliberations on whether or not to sentence Mr. Kell to death, the
trial judge entered the jury room and gave a supplemental instruction to the jurors, without
any notice to Mr. Kell or his counsel. That instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden
to Mr. Kell to prove that his life should be spared. Three jurors signed declarations
regarding this event. One juror in particular stated that she was having a difficult time
voting for the death penalty but “felt more comfortable voting for death” after the judge
spoke with jurors. (Appellant’s Br. Addendum 6, ¶ 2.) This claim was not raised in Mr.
Kell’s initial petition for post-conviction review (PCR) because counsel in Mr. Kell’s initial
PCR proceedings failed to conduct virtually any investigation of the case and therefore
failed to uncover this claim. At the time, Mr. Kell had a statutory right to the effective
assistance of counsel in PCR proceedings.
Both the lower court and Respondent agree that Mr. Kell had a right to the effective
assistance of PCR counsel at the time of his initial proceedings, but Respondent contends
that that right only applied in cases of complete default and was only enforceable through
a rule 60(b) motion in a petitioner’s original case. This argument is unsupported by both
this Court’s jurisprudence and the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
Respondent’s argument that a new PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of initial
PCR counsel must be subject to the amended version of the PCRA would similarly leave
petitioners with no viable means to enforce their statutory right to effective assistance
because it prohibits a court from granting relief on any ground that “could have been, but
2

was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief[.]” Utah Code Ann. § 78B9-106(1)(d). If a claim was never investigated or presented due to the ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel, it inherently could have been, but was not, presented in a
previous PCR petition. Thus, Mr. Kell would again be left with no avenue for relief. If Mr.
Kell had a right to the effective assistance of counsel in his initial PCR proceedings, which
all parties agree he did, there must be a mechanism, which comports with federal
constitutional requirements of due process, for him to enforce that right.
Respondent also repeatedly asserts, without factual support, that Mr. Kell made a
tactical decision to withhold this claim. However, in determining whether to grant a stay
of Mr. Kell’s federal proceedings, the United States District Court in this case had to
determine whether Mr. Kell had engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.”
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005). The federal district court found “no indication
that Kell has engaged in intentional or abusive dilatory litigation tactics” with respect to
this claim. Mem. Decision and Order, Kell v. Benzon, No. 2:07-cv-359 (D. Utah, November
16, 2017), ECF No. 258 at 11 (Addendum 1). Furthermore, the underlying claim could
have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence in Mr. Kell’s initial PCR
proceedings in 2005. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(2) (1996). Thus, the claim accrued
in 2005 but was not raised at the time as a result of the ineffective assistance of Mr. Kell’s
counsel in his in initial PCR proceedings.
Alternatively, Mr. Kell maintains that the egregious injustice exception articulated
by this Court in Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85, should apply here. This Court has
3

repeatedly applied common law exceptions to procedural bars in cases falling under the
PCRA in the exercise of its constitutional authority over post-conviction review and it
should again do so here. In the event that the Court finds that the 2008 amendments to the
PCRA prevent the Court from exercising its constitutional authority over the writ of habeas
corpus, the amendments are unconstitutional.
ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Should Find that Mr. Kell’s Claim Is Not Subject to the Current
PCRA and Is Not Procedurally Barred
Mr. Kell was denied his right to the effective assistance of PCR counsel when his

counsel failed to conduct a reasonable investigation, including failing to interview even a
single juror in Mr. Kell’s case. The decision below would leave Mr. Kell without any
mechanism to enforce his statutory right, as recognized by this Court in Menzies v. Galetka,
2006 UT 81, to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. This would violate Mr.
Kell’s federal constitutional rights to due process. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401
(1985) (“In short, when a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant
discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the
Constitution—and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause.”); Hicks v.
Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980) (where the state creates a right, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects against the arbitrary deprivation of that right by the state). To avoid
this constitutional infirmity, this Court should find that the PCRA that was in effect at the
time that Mr. Kell’s claim was defaulted applies here and that the ineffective assistance of
PCR counsel excuses any procedural default.
4

A.

Mr. Kell’s Claim was Defaulted as a Result of the Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel in His Initial PCR Proceedings when Mr. Kell Had a
Statutory Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel

The court below agreed that at the time of his initial PCR proceedings, when the
underlying claim at issue in this appeal could have been presented, Mr. Kell had a statutory
right to the effective assistance of counsel and that “[n]othing in the amendments to the
PCRA indicates that the removal of the right to the effective assistance of counsel should
apply retroactively.” (PCR II ROA at 909.1) The district court, however, left Mr. Kell with
no mechanism to enforce that right. The court found that “although Mr. Kell had the right
to the effective assistance of counsel in his initial petition, the proper procedure is to raise
his argument in a rule 60(b) motion in his initial case and not in a subsequent petition.” Id.
Respondent similarly argues that under this Court’s decision in Menzies, in order to obtain
relief Mr. Kell must file a rule 60(b) motion in his original PCR case and “would have to
show that PCI counsel completely defaulted his case.” (Appellee’s Br. at 25.) However, in
cases following Menzies, this Court found that “short of a complete default in
representation, a rule 60(b)(6) motion is an inappropriate vehicle for bringing a claim of
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel.”2 Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19, ¶ 92.

References to the record on appeal in the current proceedings will be designated as “PCR
II ROA at ___.”
1

2

Although counsel in this case failed to conduct even a cursory investigation of the case
and filed a petition that was just 21 pages in length, most of which repeated claims from
Mr. Kell’s direct appeal, contained just one case citation, and appended no declarations or
other new evidence (see Appellant’s Br. Addendum 3), the petition and appeal did comply
with filing deadlines and therefore was not considered a complete default, as was the case
5

Although this Court has limited the application of rule 60(b), Respondent’s
argument that the finding of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel in Menzies was limited
to the complete default of the case is not supported by Menzies itself. In Menzies, this Court
held that Mr. Menzies was entitled to relief under rule 60(b) because “egregious lawyer
misconduct constitutes an exceptional circumstance that may allow a litigant relief from a
default judgment under rule 60(b)(6).” 2006 UT 81, ¶ 78. In addition, the Court concluded
that there was “a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel under section 78-35a202(2)(a).” Id. ¶ 84. At no point did this Court tie the enforcement of that statutory right to
the filing of a rule 60(b) motion. In fact, this Court’s language in Menzies and subsequent
cases suggests the opposite – that rule 60(b) is the appropriate remedy only when counsel
has defaulted PCR proceedings and that short of that, petitioners must pursue some other
remedy.
Respondent relies on Honie, 2014 UT 19, to support his assertion that the holding
of Menzies is limited to its facts and that rule 60(b) is the only remedy available to a
petitioner to enforce his statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel in postconviction. (See Appellee’s Br. at 26-27.) But in Honie this Court stated that it was the use
of rule 60(b)(6) that was limited to the circumstances presented in Menzies, not the
enforcement of the right to the effective assistance of counsel in PCR proceedings. The
Court explicitly held that “a rule 60(b)(6) motion is not an appropriate vehicle for bringing

when Mr. Menzies’s counsel failed to comply with filing deadlines.
6

a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel under the facts of this case.”
Honie, 2014 UT 19, ¶ 90. The Court further explained that “in Kell v. State, we discussed
the limited scope of our holding in Menzies and concluded that rule 60(b)(6) relief is most
common when a deficiency in either representation or notice precluded appellate review.”
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. ¶ 92 (“We thus reiterate that, short of a complete default
in representation, a rule 60(b)(6) motion is an inappropriate vehicle for bringing a claim of
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel.”).
Respondent further argues that although Mr. Kell had a right to the effective
assistance of PCR counsel, “that right was not violated as this Court already concluded and
he never had a right to repeated attempts to set aside the PCI judgment on an ineffective
assistance claim he previously lost.” (Appellee’s Br. at 26 (emphasis in original).) This
argument misconstrues several aspects of Mr. Kell’s argument. First, in denying Mr. Kell’s
rule 60(b) motion, this Court found only that because Mr. Kell’s counsel did not default
his entire proceeding, he was not entitled to relief under rule 60(b). Kell v. State, 2012 UT
25, ¶¶ 19-20. The Court did not find that counsel in Mr. Kell’s initial PCR proceedings
rendered effective assistance of counsel in any aspect of Mr. Kell’s case. In fact, the Court
never addressed counsel’s performance at all. Second, even if the Court had addressed
counsel’s performance, the Court did not address whether counsel provided ineffective
assistance in failing to investigate and present the claim at issue here because that claim
was not before the court. Even if the court had found counsel did not render ineffective
assistance with respect to previously presented claims, such a finding would not preclude
7

a finding that counsel were ineffective in failing to investigate this claim. Supreme Court
precedent makes clear that counsel may be for the most part effective, but nonetheless
render ineffective assistance as to a particular issue. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374,
381, 383 (2005) (finding that although it was “not a case in which defense counsel simply
ignored their obligation to find mitigating evidence,” the lawyers were nonetheless
“deficient in failing to examine the court file on Rompilla’s prior conviction”).
Respondent further argues that “a mere Strickland showing is not enough for relief
under Menzies.” (Appellee’s Br. at 25.) However, in Menzies itself this Court stated that
the Strickland standard should apply in determining whether a petitioner’s statutory right
to the effective assistance of counsel had been violated. As this Court explained:
We can discern no reason why a statutory right to effective assistance of
counsel should be premised on something different from that of the
constitutional right: ensuring that the proceeding is reliable and fair by
requiring a properly functioning adversarial process. Menzies is no less
entitled to a proceeding that meets these standards when counsel is required
by statute than he would be if counsel were required by the Constitution. The
underlying concern is the same in each instance: when an indigent litigant
has a legal right to counsel, counsel must render effective assistance in order
to give effect to the litigant’s right. We therefore use Strickland to evaluate
Menzies’ claim.
Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 86 (internal citations omitted).
This Court was clear in Menzies that, at that time, there was a statutory right to the
effective assistance of counsel in PCR proceedings, and that the question of whether that
right had been violated was governed by the Strickland standard. See also id. ¶¶ 90-93
(looking to the ABA Guidelines to determine the relevant professional norms that should
apply). Under the Strickland standard, counsel need not, as Respondent suggests,
8

completely default a proceeding in order to have rendered ineffective assistance. See id. ¶
87 (noting that under Strickland, an attorney’s performance is deficient if it “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
688-89 (1984))).
Respondent’s argument that the only way to enforce the right to the effective
assistance of counsel in PCR proceedings is through a rule 60(b) motion, and the only
circumstance in which a rule 60(b) motion is available is in the case of complete default,
thus cannot be true. Furthermore, following Respondent’s argument that, short of a
complete default, a petitioner’s only option to enforce his right to the effective assistance
of counsel is to file a petition that is subject to the current version of the PCRA would still
leave petitioners with no viable means to enforce their statutory right to effective
assistance. This is so because the current version of the PCRA prohibits a court from
granting relief on any ground that “could have been, but was not, raised in a previous
request for post-conviction relief[.]” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(d). If a claim was
never investigated or presented due to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel,
it inherently could have been, but was not, presented in a previous PCR petition. In
addition, the 2008 amendments to the PCRA added language stating that an allegation that
PCR counsel was ineffective “cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent postconviction petition.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-109(3). Thus, under the state’s argument,
unless a petitioner in Mr. Kell’s position brought his claim between December 12, 2006,
when Menzies was decided, and May 5, 2008, when the amendments to the PCRA took
9

effect, although he had a right to the effective assistance of PCR counsel, he had no
mechanism available to enforce that right. This position is not constitutionally tenable.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 401 (“In short, when a State opts to act in a field where its action has
significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the
Constitution—and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause.”); see also Hicks,
447 U.S. at 346 (where the state creates a right, the Fourteenth Amendment protects against
the arbitrary deprivation of that right by the state); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard,
523 U.S. 272, 293 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]f a State establishes postconviction
proceedings, [then] these proceedings must comport with due process.”); Yates v. Aiken,
484 U.S. 211, 217-18 (1988) (per curiam) (unanimous court making clear that state postconviction proceedings are subject to due process protections); Campbell v. Blodgett, 997
F.2d 512, 522 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Hicks recognized that state laws which guarantee a criminal
defendant procedural rights at sentencing, even if not themselves constitutionally required,
may give rise to liberty interests protected against arbitrary deprivation by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause[.]”).
B.

This Court Should Find that This Claim is Not Time Barred

Respondent repeatedly refers to Mr. Kell’s “dilatory tactics” and his “tactical” delay
in filing this PCR petition.3 (See, e.g., Appellee’s Br. at 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 21, 22, 30, 33, 35,

3

In his brief, Respondent repeats a previously-corrected assertion that the Arizona Federal
Defender was appointed to this case in 2007. (Appellee’s Br. at 6.) In fact it was the Utah
Federal Defender that was appointed to represent Mr. Kell, not the Arizona Office, which
currently represents him. See Sealed Order Appointing the Utah Federal Defender Office
[unsealed], Kell v. Crowther, No. 2:07-cv-359-CW (D. Utah May 31, 2007), ECF No. 3.
10

36, 41, 46.) Respondent also argues that courts have found delay in other cases in which
the Federal Public Defender for the District of Arizona has acted as counsel, implying that
the same must be true in this case. (Appellee’s Br. at 29-30.) Respondent ignores that the
United States District Court in this case specifically found “no indication that Kell has
engaged in intentional or abusive dilatory litigation tactics” with respect to this claim.
Addendum 1 at 11. As Mr. Kell explained in his motion for a stay of his federal habeas
proceedings, “[t]he factual support for these claims was uncovered at approximately the
same time that the Utah Supreme Court denied Mr. Kell’s rule 60(b) motion. Thus, there
was not an appropriate opportunity to present new claims and new evidence to the state
court prior to the filing of Mr. Kell’s Amended Petition in [the federal district court].”4
Petr’s Mot. to Stay Federal Habeas Proc., Kell v. Crowther, No. 2:07-cv-359-CW-PMW
(D. Utah Aug. 28, 2017), ECF No. 245 at 16 (Addendum 3); see also Reply in Supp. of
Petr’s Mot. to Stay Federal Habeas Proc., Kell v. Crowther, No. 2:007-cv-359-CW-PMW
(D. Utah Sept. 25, 2017), ECF No. 254 at 9 (Addendum 4). In its ruling, the federal court

At that time, Mr. Kell’s proceedings in his initial PCR case had not yet concluded. In 2009,
the Utah Federal Defender Office determined that it could not represent Mr. Kell because
it had a conflict of interest, and the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the District
of Arizona was substituted as counsel. Id., ECF No. 29 (April 23, 2009). Mr. Kell filed an
initial petition for writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court on May 27, 2009, and
a motion to stay federal proceedings to allow state court litigation to resolve was filed
approximately two weeks later, on June 12, 2009. Id., ECF Nos. 36, 40, 41. The federal
case was stayed less than 60 days after the Arizona Federal Defender Office was appointed
and remained stayed until late 2012.
4

This was true due to the statute of limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
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noted that shortly after the conclusion of state court proceedings in 2012, Mr. Kell filed his
Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, wherein he presented the claim in question
for the first time.5 Id. As the federal district court explained:
Two months later the parties entered into the stipulated Case Management
Schedule, in which they agreed to address discovery and an evidentiary
hearing prior to addressing other issues. ECF No. 97 [Addendum 2]. Motions
related to discovery and evidentiary hearing were resolved on June 23, 2017
(ECF No. 238), and counsel filed this motion on August 27, 2017. The court
does not find Kell to have engaged in intentional or abusive dilatory litigation
tactics.
(Addendum 1 at 11.)6

Respondent claims that Mr. Kell “merely noted the declarations in a habeas petition to a
court that, under federal law could not even consider them.” (Appellee’s Br. at 12 (citing
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) and Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011)).) This is an
overly simplistic characterization of the ability of a federal court to grant relief when
presented with a claim that the respondent argues is unexhausted and/or procedurally
defaulted. First, Pinholster, cited by Respondent, applies only to claims that have been
adjudicated on the merits by the state court, and is therefore not applicable to a claim that
has truly been defaulted. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) (noting that the limitations on relief apply
“with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings”).
Second, under federal law there are several exceptions to procedural default rules that may
apply in any given case and have not yet been litigated in the instant case. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991); Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012);
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Harris v.
Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989); Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002).
5

6

Respondent also repeatedly contends that Mr. Kell waited to initiate proceedings in state
court “until filing it provided optimal potential to stall final judgment in his federal habeas
case.” (Appellee’s Br. at 21; see also id. at 12, 35.) This argument is a red herring. The
length of time necessary to complete state court litigation is independent of when in the
course of Mr. Kell’s federal proceedings the stay occurs. The amount of delay in Mr. Kell’s
federal habeas case is dependent on the course of the state court proceedings and
presumably would be the same regardless of when during the pendency of his federal
proceedings the stay was granted.
12

Respondent argues that “[u]nder the plain terms of the PCRA, [Mr. Kell] could have
presented those declarations in a post-conviction petition within one year of when
reasonable diligence would have led him to them. Had he done so, he would have received
merits review.” (Appellee’s Br. at 11 (emphasis added).) But reasonable diligence would
have led counsel to the underlying claim in this case in 2005. Indeed, the PCRA in effect
at that time contained the same statute of limitations as the one in the current PCRA.
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(2) (1996) with § 78B-9-107(2) (2017).
Respondent takes issue with Mr. Kell’s statement that, had he filed his petition in
2013 it already would have been barred as a result of the ineffective assistance of PCR
counsel, (Appellee’s Br. at 17-18), but nowhere in his brief does Respondent point to any
authority to support his contention that the statute of limitations starts over when new
counsel is appointed. Furthermore, Respondent’s contention that “both the post-conviction
court and the State” were willing to waive PCR counsel’s failure to comply with the statute
of limitations, (Appellee’s Br. at 23 n.4), is untrue. In the lower court, Respondent argued,
“Of course, the burden rests on Kell to show that ‘the exercise of reasonable diligence’
would not have led to the discovery and filing of his claim even earlier. Utah Code Ann. §
78B-9-107(2)(e); see also id. § 78B-9-105(2). . . . Kell has given no explanation why he
could not have obtained the juror declarations even earlier than 2013. Kell’s legal team
could have approached the declarant jurors as early as 1996, immediately after the jury
convicted and sentenced him.” (PCR II ROA at 729 n.3.)
Respondent contends that “PCI counsel’s involvement is entirely beside the point”
13

for purposes of determining when the claim accrued under § 78B-9-107(2)(e). Id. at 15-18.
Simultaneously, Respondent argues that Mr. Kell defaulted his claim under § 78B-9106(1)(d) because it could have been discovered and presented in his initial PCR
proceedings. (Appellee’s Br. at 18-19.) But the claim cannot be defaulted under § 78B-9106 based on one date of availability, and barred under § 78B-9-107 based on a different
date. If the claim “could have been, but was not” raised in Mr. Kell’s initial 2005 PCR
petition, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(c), then counsel in Mr. Kell’s 2005 proceedings
also “knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,” about the
evidentiary basis of the claim, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107 (emphasis added). Respondent
cannot have it both ways.
C.

This Court Should Find that the PCRA in Effect at the Time of Mr.
Kell’s Initial PCR Proceedings Applies

Respondent argues that the current version of the PCRA should apply to Mr. Kell’s
case because “the right Menzies read into the statute could only permit bypassing a
procedural impediment to considering the merits of a separate claim that may justify postconviction relief. It could not get Menzies substantive relief from his conviction.”
(Appellee’s Br. at 32.) Respondent cites no language in Menzies or any other case to
support this conclusion.
This Court’s decision in Menzies does not support Respondent’s argument. Before
addressing the issues in Menzies’s case, the Court noted the constitutional significance
both of its own role and of the fundamental rights at issue in a capital post-conviction
proceeding:
14

While the issues before us deal only with Menzies’ 60(b) motion, we must
not lose sight of the fact that the case before us is a post-conviction petition
seeking habeas corpus relief from a death penalty sentence. A postconviction proceeding is a proceeding of constitutional importance, over
which the judiciary has supervisory responsibilities due to our constitutional
role. In discharging this role, we must recognize the stakes involved in postconviction proceedings, take appropriate steps to satisfy ourselves of the
reliability of convictions and death sentences, and ensure that a petitioner’s
fundamental rights are adequately protected. As this court has previously
noted, “[T]he law should not be so blind and unreasoning that where an
injustice has resulted the [plaintiff] should be without remedy.”
Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 62 (quoting Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979))
(alterations in Menzies). In announcing its ruling, the Court never mentioned that the right
was limited to a particular procedural context but stated only, “we conclude that Menzies
has a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel under section 78-35a-202(2)(a).”
Id. ¶ 84. Furthermore, the Court premised the statutory right on the same basis as the
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. See id. ¶ 86 (“Menzies is no less
entitled to a proceeding that meets these standards when counsel is required by statute than
he would be if counsel were required by the Constitution.”).
The language of the 2008 PCRA amendment also supports the reading of Menzies
as establishing a substantive right. The statute states, “An allegation that counsel appointed
under this section was ineffective cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent postconviction petition.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-109(3) (emphasis added). It is unlikely the
legislature would have felt the need to remove the ineffective assistance of PCR counsel as
a substantive basis for relief had it not understood this Court to be granting a substantive
right in Menzies.
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Respondent’s reliance on State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, is misplaced. In Clark, the
question before the Court was whether the appellants, who were the victims of a crime, had
standing to appeal a lower court’s order in the criminal case. The Court first acknowledged
that “[t]here is no inherent right to appellate review. Such a right must be positively
recognized by statute or a constitutional provision.” Id. ¶ 6 (citations omitted). The statute
in question had been amended twice, leaving an approximately one-year gap during which
crime victims did not have a right to appeal. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. It was during this gap that appellants
filed their appeal. Id. ¶ 9.
In addressing the appellant’s argument, the Court noted that in Utah there is a
“statutory bar against the retroactive application of newly codified laws,” with the only
exception being when “the provision is expressly declared to be retroactive.” Id. ¶ 11. In
distinguishing between substantive and procedural rights, the court noted, “With respect to
‘procedural statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation of a suit,’ . . . we have held that
the new law applies ‘not only to future actions, but also to accrued and pending actions,’
and that ‘further proceedings in a pending case are governed by the new procedural law.’”
Id. ¶ 12 (quoting Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000-01 (Utah 1982)). Thus,
if Respondent’s interpretation were correct, Mr. Kell’s right to the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel would have been extinguished before he even filed his rule 60(b)
motion in his original proceeding. See Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, ¶ 3 (noting that Mr. Kell
filed his rule 60(b) motion in January 2009); see also Honie, 2014 UT 19, ¶ 92 (discussing
right to effective representation by PCR counsel where PCR case spanned time before and
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after 2008 amendments to the PCRA were enacted); Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ¶
17 (rule 60(b) motion regarding ineffective assistance of PCR counsel filed in July 2009).
The fact that this Court never found that the right established in Menzies was extinguished
at the time the 2008 amendments to the PCRA became effective indicates that the right is
substantive, not procedural.
II.

The Judicial Exceptions to the PCRA Remain in Effect and Should Be Applied
to This Case
Even if this Court finds that the current version of the PCRA applies to Mr. Kell’s

claim, the claim can still be reviewed on the merits under the judicial exceptions to the
PCRA. Respondent argues, “The [2008 amendments to the] PCRA and rule 65C abolished
the common law exceptions.” (Appellee’s Br. at 33.) However, this Court has never held
that to be the case and in Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85, the most recent opinion on the
matter, suggested that judicial exceptions to the PCRA remain valid.
Respondent first argues that the pre-Winward cases cited by Mr. Kell are no longer
valid because they pre-date the 2008 amendments to the PCRA, but he has not articulated
where in the amendments the legislature directly repudiated the concepts established by
this Court’s decisions. (See Appellee’s Br. at 33.) The 2008 amendments included language
stating that the PCRA was the “sole remedy” to obtain post-conviction relief, but
Respondent has not established how that language directly altered the system that was in
place prior to the 2008 amendments. In the cases relied upon by Mr. Kell, this Court applied
the PCRA in effect at the time to each of the petitions in question. See Tilman v. State,
2005 UT 56, ¶ 22 (noting that although the PCRA codified only the first two “good cause”
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factors identified by the Court, “because the power to review post-conviction petitions
quintessentially belongs to the judicial branch of government, and not the legislature, all
five common law exceptions retain their independent constitutional significance and may
be examined by this court in our review of post-conviction petitions” (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)); Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, ¶ 17; Gardner v. State, 2010
UT 46, ¶¶ 93-94 (noting that “[t]he State acknowledges that this court retains constitutional
authority, even when a petition is procedurally barred, to determine whether denying relief
would result in an egregious injustice,” but declining to determine the extent of that
authority because “Mr. Gardner has failed to persuade us that we ought to invoke it in this
case”). The Court did not provide a remedy that was outside the PCRA in these instances
but rather acknowledged its inherent constitutional authority to apply the common law in
its review of post-conviction petitions.
Furthermore, this Court has referred to the PCRA as being the “equivalent” of the
AEDPA in the federal context. Kell, 2012 UT 25, ¶ 25. The AEDPA similarly occupies the
field of federal habeas corpus jurisprudence. There is no avenue for an inmate to obtain
habeas relief in the federal courts that does not go through the AEDPA, including
provisions such as the statute of limitations applicable to petitions, limitations on a federal
court’s ability to grant relief, and restrictions on second or successive petitions. See, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, 2255. The common law, including judicial exceptions to
procedural bars, nonetheless continue to play an important role in habeas jurisprudence
following the 1996 enactment of the AEDPA. See, e.g., Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386,
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393, 394 (2004) (“The cause and prejudice requirement shows due regard for States’
finality and comity interests while ensuring that ‘fundamental fairness [remains] the central
concern of the writ of habeas corpus.’” (alteration in Haley)); Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S.
1, 9 (2012).
Respondent also argues that in order to qualify for relief under Winward, Mr. Kell
would have to establish that both PCR and current counsel provided ineffective assistance.
(Appellee’s Br. at 35.) Winward, however, requires a petitioner to provide a “reasonable
justification” for missing the deadline. Winward, 2012 UT 85 ¶ 18. Although Winward
himself alleged ineffective assistance of counsel as his justification, nothing in the language
of the case suggests that this is the only permissible justification. Rather, the Court stated,
“To prove that his case meets the threshold test, ‘a petitioner must persuade the court that,
given the combined weight of the meritoriousness of the petitioner’s claim and the
justifications for raising it late,’ the court should consider recognizing an exception to the
PCRA’s procedural rules.” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Gardner, 2010 UT 46, ¶ 94). As Mr. Kell
argued in his opening brief and in the court below, and as was found by the federal district
court in this case, Mr. Kell filed his petition at the earliest opportunity, given the course of
litigation in his federal habeas case and the limitations placed on his counsel’s ability to
represent him in state court proceedings. (See Addendum 1 at 11 (finding that Mr. Kell had
not engaged in any intentional delay); Appellant’s Br. at 25 and n.2; PCR II ROA at 82124.) Had current counsel filed the petition earlier, it would have had no impact on the
applicability of the time bar in either the current or prior version of the PCRA because the
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claim was available “in the exercise of reasonable diligence” at the time of Mr. Kell’s initial
PCR proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(2)(e) (2004); § 78B-9-107(2)(e) (2017).
Furthermore, Mr. Kell has presented a meritorious claim supported by declarations from
three separate jurors. The weight of Mr. Kell’s claim, combined with the reasonable
justifications he has provided, satisfy the requirements of Winward.
Respondent also asserts that Mr. Kell has not briefed the particulars of the Winward
exception (Appellee’s Br. at 37), but then proceeds to take issue with the particulars of the
exceptions suggested by Mr. Kell, (Appellee’s Br. at 37-41). For example, Respondent
argues that the Court cannot create a Martinez-like standard because Martinez applies only
to claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness and because “Martinez is unique to the demands
of federal habeas procedure and can do no work in Utah.” (Appellee’s Br. at 38.) First, Mr.
Kell’s suggestion that this Court could articulate a standard that is similar to or based upon
the exceptions articulated by the Supreme Court in Coleman and Martinez, i.e. based upon
the ineffective assistance of counsel in an initial post-conviction proceeding, or more
broadly on a cause and prejudice standard, does not require this Court to adopt a standard
that is identical to Martinez. The fact that the federal standard is limited to claims of trial
counsel ineffectiveness does not require this Court to do the same.7

7

In his dissenting opinion Justice Scalia forcefully pointed out that there was no principled
basis on which to limit the Martinez ruling to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims:
“There is not a dime’s worth of difference in principle between those cases and many other
cases in which initial state habeas will be the first opportunity for a particular claim to be
raised[.]” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Second, Respondent’s contention that Martinez itself does not apply in Utah is both
irrelevant and inaccurate. The only federal court to address the issue has found that
Martinez does apply in Utah. See Memorandum Decision and Order on Petitioner’s Motion
for Consideration of the Application of Martinez v. Ryan, Lafferty v. Crowther, No. 2:07CV-322 (D. Utah Dec. 14, 2015), ECF No. 400 at 3-5 (“[T]he court finds that Martinez
applies in Utah pursuant to Trevino where Utah’s procedural rules ‘make it highly unlikely
in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal.’” (quoting Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.
Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013)). Even if Respondent were correct that Martinez does not apply in
federal proceedings in Utah, such a rule would have no bearing on the state court’s ability
to implement a similarly-framed exception to procedural default rules in state postconviction proceedings. It is not uncommon for states to have more expansive protections
than required under federal law. This is precisely what this Court did in Menzies. See
Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 84 (recognizing that the Supreme Court had held there was no
right to the effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings).
As a more limited alternative, Mr. Kell suggested that the Court could limit the
Winward exception to cases where, “after meeting the threshold requirements of Winward,
a petitioner under sentence of death identifies a clear constitutional violation that occurred
during either phase of trial which, absent application of the egregious injustice exception,
would never be reviewed on the merits.” (Appellant’s Br. at 30.) Respondent contends this
would provide “immunity for condemned prisoners to bring claims whenever they want
21

without regard to their diligence or timeliness, so long as merits review can delay
conclusion of their cases.” (Appellee’s Br. at 41.) Respondent ignores the procedural
limitations that prevent this from being true. First, the procedural limitations of the PCRA
would continue to apply in most instances. Second, Winward itself requires that as a
threshold matter a petitioner “must demonstrate that he has a reasonable justification for
missing the deadline” and that the underlying claim has “an arguable basis in fact, which
would support a claim for relief as a matter of law.” Winward, 2012 UT 85, ¶¶ 18, 20
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In Winward, it was these threshold
requirements that prevented Mr. Winward from having his claim heard. Id. ¶¶ 21, 22-27.
Thus, Respondent’s contention that a petitioner could “bring claims whenever they want”
is unfounded.
III.

If Mr. Kell is Without a Remedy, then the 2008 Amendments to the PCRA are
Unconstitutional
Respondent contends that Mr. Kell’s argument that if the 2008 amendments to the

PCRA restricted the authority of this Court over the writ of habeas corpus, they are
unconstitutional, is “inadequately briefed.” (Appellee’s Br. at 42.) Respondent fails to
articulate how Mr. Kell’s briefing is inadequate, except to argue that it is “doubtful” the
issue could be adequately briefed in the number of pages Mr. Kell devoted to the issue in
his Opening Brief. Id.
Respondent then takes issue with Mr. Kell’s characterization of this Court’s
decision in Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), arguing that the Court “did not hold
that the PCRA’s one-year limitations period was unconstitutional.” (Appellee’s Br. at 43.)
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Mr. Kell never so stated. (See Appellant’s Br. at 34 (arguing that this Court held in Julian
that “such restrictions on the Great Writ,” i.e. those that “purport to restrict the authority of
the Utah courts over the writ of habeas corpus,” “are impermissible”); see also id. at 35
(describing the Court’s discussion of the one-year statute of limitations in Julian as “the
court noted” (emphasis added)); Julian, 966 P.2d at 253 (“We therefore hold that section
78-12-25(3), the four-year statute of limitations provision, may not be constitutionally
applied to bar a habeas corpus petition. . . . Applying the catchall statute to bar habeas
petitions not only violates the Utah Constitution's open courts provision in article I, section
11, but also violates the separation of powers provision in article V, section 1.”). Beyond
this, Respondent has not identified any deficiencies in Mr. Kell’s constitutional argument.
Respondent again argues that even under the common law, Mr. Kell’s claim fails
because he has not shown that “he did not withhold his claim for tactical reasons or that
reasonable diligence would not have led him to raise the claim in his PCI proceedings.”
(Appellee’s Br. at 45.) Mr. Kell addressed this issue extensively in his Opening Brief and
throughout this Reply. (See Appellant’s Br. at 19-23, 28-29; see also PCR II ROA at 3134, 817-18, 821-24.) Respondent’s assertion he “never attempted to meet his burdens under
the common law to show that he did not withhold his claim for tactical reasons” is therefore
unfounded.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated in his Opening Brief, Mr. Kell
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order granting summary
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judgment and remand this case with instructions to address Mr. Kell’s claim on the merits.
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of August, 2019
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

TROY MICHAEL KELL,

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff,

DECISION AND ORDER

v.
SCOTT CROWTHER, WARDEN, UTAH
STATE PRISON;

2:07-CV-00359-CW
Judge Clark Waddoups

Defendant.

Before the court is Petitioner Troy Michael Kell’s Motion to Stay Federal Habeas
Proceedings pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005). (ECF No. 245.)
Respondent (the State) filed its opposition. (ECF No. 247.) Kell addressed the State’s
objections in his reply. (ECF. 254.) Kell moves this court to stay his federal habeas proceedings
while he returns to state court to attempt to exhaust previously unexhausted claims, specifically
Claims 3(D) and 3(F) from his amended petition. The State opposes Kell’s motion, arguing that
he has not shown good cause for failing to exhaust his claims, the claims lack any potential
merit, and the motion is dilatory.
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Kell was serving a life-without-parole sentence for murder when he stabbed fellow
inmate Lonnie Blackmon to death. On August 1, 1996, a jury convicted Kell and sentenced him
to death. See generally State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019 (Utah 2002). On November 1, 2002, the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed Kell’s conviction and sentence. (Id.) On August 1, 2005, Kell’s postconviction counsel filed a 21-page Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief that contained
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only one case citation, and appended no declarations or other new evidence. (PCR 252-72.)1
The state moved to dismiss, (PCR 290-93), and the court granted the motion. The Utah Supreme
Court affirmed. Kell v. State, 194 P.3d 913 (Utah 2008).
On January 13, 2009, Mr. Kell filed a pro se motion for relief pursuant to Utah Rule
60(b) in the state court, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in his postconviction proceedings because counsel had failed to investigate and failed to raise many
meritorious claims. (PCR 684-51.) Four months later federal habeas counsel filed an Initial
Petition in Kell’s federal habeas case. (ECF No. 36.) On June 12, 2009, counsel filed a motion
to stay federal habeas proceedings, so that he could resolve previously-pending state court
litigation. (ECF Nos. 40, 41.) In its order on the motion to stay, the court noted that Kell had
filed a “protective federal habeas petition,” despite still-pending state court litigation, in order to
ensure compliance with the AEDPA statute of limitations. (ECF No. 51.)
The Utah Supreme Court denied the Rule 60(b) appeal. Rehearing was denied and the
case was remitted on September 24, 2012. Kell filed his amended petition in this court on
January 14, 2013. (ECF No. 94.) His Amended Petition included, for the first time, Claims 3(D)
and 3(F), both of which allege extraneous influence on jurors. (ECF No. 94 at 33-40.) These
claims were supported by declarations from jurors that were signed in May 2012, after the Utah
Supreme Court had issued its opinion denying Mr. Kell’s Rule 60(b) motion. (See ECF No. 94,
exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5, 10, and 11.) Kell asserts that his Amended Petition in this court was his first
available opportunity to raise these claims after the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion in state court.

The court will cite to the record of Kell’s state post-conviction proceedings, Utah Sixth Judicial
District, Sanpete County Case No. 030600171, as “PCR” and the Bates-stamped page numbers,
for example PCR 431. A copy of this record is filed with the clerk’s office in conjunction with
ECF No. 118.

1
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II.

ANALYSIS

District courts have inherent authority to issue stays, and AEDPA does not deprive courts
of that authority. But it does limit their discretion to exercise that authority because a stay
pursuant to Rhines creates tension between AEDPA’s goals of federalism and comity and its goal
of streamlining the federal habeas process. As a result any stay under Rhines cannot be
indefinite and must meet certain criteria. The petitioner must show that (1) good cause exists for
his failure to exhaust, (2) his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and (3) he has not
engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276-78. “Petitioner,
as movant, has the burden to show he is entitled to a stay under the Rhines factors.” Carter v.
Friel, 415 F.Supp.2d 1314, 1317 (D. Utah 2006).
A. Good Cause
The United States Supreme Court in Rhines did not define with any precision what
constitutes “good cause.” One month after the Rhines decision, however, the Court stated that
“[a] petitioner’s reasonable confusion about whether a state filing would be timely will ordinarily
constitute ‘good cause’ to excuse his failure to exhaust.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,
416-17 (2005).
Since the Pace decision, district courts have reached different conclusions about whether
good cause in the Rhines context is akin to good cause to excuse procedural default in federal
court (which is a high standard because it allows the district court to consider the merits of a
defaulted claim) or a more expansive and equitable reading of good cause (which is a lower
standard that allows the claim to return to the state court for merits review). Compare
Hernandez v. Sullivan, 397 F. Supp.2d 1205, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (courts should look to
procedural default law to determine cause), with Rhines v. Weber, 408 F.Supp.2d 844, 848-49
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(D.S.D. 2005) (Rhines II) (rejecting procedural default analysis for cause in exhaustion context).
Based in part on those different standards, some district courts have found that ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel constitutes good cause for failure to exhaust. See, e.g.,
Vasquez v. Parrott, 397 F.Supp.2d 452, 464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); See also Rhines II.
There is no Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that explains what constitutes “good
cause” in the context of a Rhines motion. The only circuit court to directly address whether the
good cause standard should be high or low is the Ninth Circuit. In Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977
(9th Cir. 2014), the court followed Pace and Rhines II to find that good cause for a Rhines stay
cannot be any more demanding than a showing of cause for procedural default under Martinez v.
Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and, in fact, may be less demanding.
In two recent cases in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, two district
court judges clarified “good cause” in the context of a Rhines motion. Lafferty v. Crowther, No.
2:07-CV-322, ECF No. 379 (D. Utah Oct. 30, 2015); Archuleta v. Crowther, No. 2:07-CV-630,
ECF No. 107 (D. Utah Nov. 12, 2014). Both courts found the analysis of Blake and Rhines II
persuasive because in the Rhines context a petitioner is returning to state court to allow the state
court to consider his claims. The Lafferty and Archuleta courts’ reasoning reflects the important
distinction between the “good cause” necessary to excuse the default of state claims, allowing for
federal review of a claim, and the “good cause” necessary to excuse the default of state claims,
allowing a petitioner to return to state court in order to afford the state court the first opportunity
to consider the claim. “Good cause” in the context of a stay and abeyance procedure is distinct in
that the federal court is not preventing the state court from reviewing a claim, rather it is deciding
whether a stay is permissible so that the state court can first review the claims before it is
presented in federal court.
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The Blake court held that ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel can
establish good cause for failure to exhaust. “While a bald assertion [of ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel] cannot amount to a showing of good cause, a reasonable excuse,
supported by the evidence to justify a petitioner’s failure to exhaust, will.” Blake, 745 F.3d at
982. The judges in Archuleta and Lafferty agreed with the Blake court that “ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel may constitute good cause for failure to exhaust claims in
state court. Archuleta v. Crowther, No. 2:07-CV-630, ECF No. 107 at 9-10; Lafferty v.
Crowther, No. 2:07-CV-322, ECF No. 379 at 8.
The State argues that unless post-conviction counsel had some reason to believe that the
jury deliberations had been extraneously influenced, counsel’s performance could not have been
deficient for not interviewing the jurors. However, the only way that counsel could have
established reason to believe jurors’ deliberations had been extraneously influenced would be by
speaking with the jurors. The Supreme Court has held that a decision to cease investigation must
itself be based on a reasonable investigation. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 69091 (1984); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 396 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533-34
(2003). Post-conviction counsel could not have made a reasonable strategic decision to limit
investigation of jurors because counsel had not conducted any investigation at all. Counsel filed
a perfunctory petition, failed to conduct even a cursory investigation of the case, including
failing to interview even a single juror, and admitted that none of these decisions were strategic.
See ECF No. 94 at 150-51, 156-60; ECF No. 94-1 Ex. 15; ECF No. 115 at 180-85; ECF No. 1151 Ex. 1 at ¶ 6; ECF No. 245 at 12, 15. State post-conviction counsel’s deficient performance
constitutes cause under Rhines.
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B. Potentially Meritorious
For a federal case to be stayed, the unexhausted claims must be “potentially meritorious”
and not “plainly meritless.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78.
Kell argues that his claims are “potentially meritorious” because Rhines requires nothing
more than a showing that he raised a “colorable federal claim.” ECF No. 245 at 8. He argues
that the substance of his claims is not plainly meritless, and that state procedural rules are
irrelevant to the inquiry.
The State argues that this hurdle is less about the substance of a claim and more about the
procedural way that it would be presented to, and treated by, the state courts. The State argues
that Kell’s claims are plainly meritless within the meaning of Rhines because time and
procedural bars would prevent Kell from exhausting the merits of his claims in state court. ECF
No. 247 at 20.
The court in Lafferty, when addressing the identical argument—that Mr. Lafferty’s
claims were not potentially meritorious because they would be barred in state court—held the
following: “The Utah Supreme Court may agree with the state. It may not. But it is the state
court, not the federal court, that should determine the procedural posture of a claim.” Order,
Lafferty, 2:07-cv-322-DB, ECF No. 379 at 9. “Whether a state remedy is presently available is a
question of state law as to which only the state courts may speak with final authority.” Simpson
v. Camper, 927 F.2d 392, 393 (8th Cir. 1991). “[A] federal court always must be chary about
reaching a conclusion, based upon a speculative analysis of what a state court might do, that a
particular claim is procedurally foreclosed.” Pike v. Guarino, 492 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 2007). “If
the state court resolves the unexhausted claim on a procedural ground, such as a procedural bar
under state law, [then] the federal court will review that disposition, applying the standard of
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review that is appropriate under the circumstances.” Fairchild v. Workman, 579 F.3d 1134, 1153
(10th Cir. 2009). Federalism and comity require that the state courts have the opportunity to
make those procedural decisions. Thus, in considering whether Kell’s claims are potentially
meritorious, this court will not address possible state court time and procedural bars, but will
leave the determination of the procedural posture of the claims to the state court.
1. Claim 3(D) is not potentially meritorious and therefore fails to meet the
Rhines requirement
Kell argues in claim 3(D) that his right to a fair and impartial jury was violated when the
jurors considered extraneous information and failed to adhere to the court’s instructions
regarding their discussion of matters presented at trial. The sources of the alleged extraneous
information were (1) “discussions between jurors regarding the content of the trial while the trial
was still in process,” and (2) “communications to the jurors from the CUCF [Central Utah
Correction Facility] staff regarding their opinions on the appropriate outcome for the trial and
dangerousness of Mr. Kell.” ECF No. 245 at 10. The court finds that claim 3(D) does not satisfy
the potentially meritorious prong of the Rhines analysis, because even if factually true, it does
not show that jurors were exposed to any improper extraneous information.
The court notes that under both the Utah Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, a juror “may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the
jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s
mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.” Utah R. Evid. 606(b)(1); Fed. R. Evid.
606(b)(1). “The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on
these matters.” Id. There is, however, an exception to this rule: a court may consider a juror’s
testimony about whether “extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury’s attention,” or whether “an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.”
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Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(2). The “extraneous influences exception covers only “misconduct such as
jurors reading news reports about the case, jurors communicating with third parties, bribes and
jury tampering.” United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1236 (10th Cir. 2008).
In Kell’s case, two of the jurors carpooled to and from the trial each day and sometimes
discussed the fact that the trial was giving them nightmares. ECF No. 94-1, Exhibits 5 and 11.
However, neither juror attests to discussing “the content of the trial.” They merely state that they
discussed how the content of the trial was giving them nightmares. Their nightmares, which
preceded their discussion, were mental impressions concerning the case. And the discussion
itself, between two jurors, was not an external influence; it was intrinsic. See U.S. v. Bassler,
651 F.2d 600, 601-2 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that “[i]ntrinsic influences on a jury’s verdict,” such
as notes shared among jurors, “are not competent to impeach a verdict”). The jurors do not attest
that they had any pre-deliberation discussion about the trial evidence, but even if they did discuss
some of the content of the case, there is no indication of extrinsic influence being brought to bear
on any juror.
The second aspect of claim 3(D) is that there were communications to the jurors from the
CUCF staff regarding their opinions on the appropriate outcome for the trial. The source of this
claim was the declaration of one juror, who stated that “there was also community pressure to
sentence Kell to death. I knew people who worked at the prison. When I would enter the prison,
I understood the sentiment for a death sentence was strong among the prison guards that I
passed. All of the prison guards wanted the death sentence. All of them. A lot of people looked
at is [sic] as, ‘He killed somebody and he ought to be killed.’” ECF No. 94, Exhibit 10. The
juror does not say how he arrived at his conclusion. He attests only to his impression about the
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sentiment among the security guards. As such, his testimony does not fall under any recognized
exception to Rule 606(b). Thus, the evidence supporting claim 3(D) is inadmissible.
A second juror stated: “Deputies escorted us to our vehicles because they were afraid
somebody might retaliate against us. I guess they thought we might be sniped or something.”
ECF No. 94, Exhibit 4. Neither of these jurors’ statements support the claim that prison staff
told or overtly communicated to the jurors their opinions about the proper outcome. Phrases like
“I understood,” “people looked at [us] as,” and “I guess they thought” make it clear that both of
these jurors were simply attesting to their impressions, which are speculative and inadmissible.
Neither of them attests to any actual communication by any prison staff member. As a result,
claim 3(D) fails to show error, much less a constitutional violation.
2. Claim 3(F) is potentially meritorious and therefore meets the second
prong of the Rhines analysis
In claim 3(F) Kell argues that a supplemental instruction to the jury by the trial court
judge unconstitutionally shifted the burden to him to prove that the jury should not impose death.
ECF No. 94 at 39. Three jurors recall the judge providing clarification for them on a point of
law during their sentencing deliberations. ECF No. 94, Exhibits 2, 5, 6. Specifically, one juror
stated:
I had a difficult time voting for the death penalty but I agreed to do so after Judge
Mower came and spoke to the jurors as we deliberated. He told us that Kell’s
attorneys had to show us that Kell’s life should be spared. The jury had bogged
down over a definition but the judge’s statement helped because we wanted to be
sure that we were doing the right thing. I remember that the judge was asked a
question while he was speaking to us, and he kidded around and said he couldn’t
address that question, and said that it was up to us. After the judge came and
spoke to us, I felt more comfortable voting for death.
ECF No. 94, Exhibit 5 at ¶ 2. That same juror also recalled that “[t]here was no defense attorney
present when the judge spoke to us during deliberations, though there was somebody with him.”
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Id. at ¶ 3. There is no indication from the trial transcript of a question from the jury after the
beginning of the guilt or penalty deliberations. ROA at 5464-67, 5735-37, 5742.
Kell argues that the trial judge’s alleged instruction to the jury tainted the deliberation
process and unconstitutionally shifted the burden to him to prove that his life should be spared.
He also asserts that the judge’s alleged actions violated the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which state that if the jury “desire[s] to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause,” the
jury should “be brought before the court where, in the presence of the defendant and both
counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall
be given,” or the court may “respond to the inquiry in writing, . . . and the response thereto shall
be entered in the record.” Utah R. Crim. P. 17(n). Kell argues that this was a prejudicial error of
constitutional magnitude, and that therefore, he has a colorable claim for state-court relief.
Counsel in Kell’s state habeas proceedings admitted that he was unaware of this issue
because he failed to speak with any of the jurors, and that there was no strategic reason for his
failure to do so. ECF No. 94, Exhibit 15 at ¶¶ 3, 4, 12, 14. Because counsel was unaware of the
issue, he failed to raise this claim to the state court, meaning that Kell has been denied the
opportunity to have this potentially significant claim reviewed by the state court. Counsel’s
failure to raise this potentially meritorious claim constitutes good cause under Rhines.
C. Intentionally Dilatory Litigation Tactics
The final Rhines requirement is that the petitioner show that he has not engaged in
“abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. This requirement
recognizes that “capital petitioners might deliberately engage in dilatory tactics to prolong their
incarceration and avoid execution of the sentence of death. Without time limits, petitioners could
frustrate AEDPA’s goal of finality by dragging out indefinitely their federal habeas review.” Id.
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The State argues that Kell’s Rhines motion is dilatory, because it comes ten years into this
federal case and after his federal habeas petition has been submitted for decision on oral
argument. Although Kell notes that he has complied with the requirements of the Case
Management Schedule as agreed to by the parties and ordered by the court, the State argues that
the case management schedule did not prohibit Kell from asking for a Rhines stay earlier.
The court finds no indication that Kell has engaged in intentional or abusive dilatory
litigation tactics. Although federal habeas counsel was initially appointed in this case in 2007,
the federal proceedings were stayed and could not move forward because state proceedings were
still ongoing from that time until late 2012. In its order staying the federal proceedings, this
court found that Kell had filed a “protective federal habeas petition,” despite the pendency of
litigation in state court, in order to ensure compliance with the AEDPA statute of limitations.
ECF No. 51. Shortly after the state court proceedings concluded, Kell filed in this court his
Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which included for the first time claims 3(D) and
3(F). Kell noted in his Amended Petition that he would be filing a motion for a stay pursuant to
Rhines at the appropriate time. Two months later the parties entered into the stipulated Case
Management Schedule, in which they agreed to address discovery and an evidentiary hearing
prior to addressing other issues. ECF No. 97. Motions related to discovery and evidentiary
hearing were resolved on June 23, 2017 (ECF No. 238), and counsel filed this motion on August
28, 2017. The court does not find Kell to have engaged in intentional or abusive dilatory
litigation tactics.
III.

CONCLUSION

After carefully considering the arguments and claims before the court in Kell’s Motion to
Stay (ECF No. 245.), this court hereby grants a limited stay and abeyance only with respect to
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Claim 3(F) of his Amended Petition so that he may properly exhaust that claim in the state court.
The court denies the motion with respect to Claim 3(D). Mr. Kell must commence his
proceedings in state court within thirty days of this order, and he shall provide the court with
status updates every three months. Mr. Kell must notify the court immediately upon the
resolution of the state court proceedings.
Also, the court authorizes the Public Defender of the District of Arizona to represent Kell
in state court proceedings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3599, so that he may attempt to properly
exhaust Claim 3(F).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 16th day of November, 2017.

BY THE COURT:

CLARK WADDOUPS
United States District Court Judge
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
TROY MICHAEL KELL,
Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR CASE
MANAGEMENT SCHEDULE

v.
STEVEN TURLEY, Warden, Utah State
Prison,

Case No. 2:07-CV-359
Judge Paul M. Warner

Respondent.

The parties agreed to a case management schedule and filed a motion asking the Court to
accept it. (See Dkt. No. 96.)
The Court grants the motion and accepts the following case management schedule:
ANSWERING OF THE AMENDED PETITION:
1.

By July 15, 2013, Respondent will file his response to the amended petition. The

parties will work together to lodge the state court record with the Court by that date.
2.

If Respondent files a dispositive motion in addition to his response, Petitioner

will respond pursuant to the applicable rules and any orders of the Court.
3.

Within 45 days of the filing of Respondent’s response, Petitioner will file a reply.

DISCOVERY:
4.

Within 90 days of the filing of the reply, the parties will file their respective

motions for discovery, including their proposed schedules.
5.

Within 180 days of the Court’s discovery order resolving any disputes and/or

adopting a discovery schedule, the parties will complete discovery.
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EVIDENTIARY HEARING:
6.

Within 60 days of the close of discovery, either party may file a motion for an

evidentiary hearing.
7.

A party’s response will be filed within 60 days of the filed motion for an

evidentiary hearing.
8.

A party’s reply will be due within 30 days after the response is filed.

9.

If the Court holds an evidentiary hearing, the parties will seek post-hearing

briefing on the issues addressed at the hearing and work together to create a briefing schedule.
10.

After a final Court ruling on the evidentiary hearing issues, the parties will seek

briefing on any remaining non-hearing issues and work together to create a briefing schedule.
SO ORDERED this 6th day of March, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

________________________________________
Paul M. Warner
United States Magistrate Judge
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Jon M. Sands
Federal Public Defender
Lindsey Layer (VA Bar No. 79151)
Alexandra Hicks LeClair (AZ Bar No. 026269)
Assistant Federal Public Defenders
46 West Broadway, Suite 110
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 524-6041 voice
(602) 889-3960 facsimile
Lindsey_Layer@fd.org
Alexandra_Leclair@fd.org
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
Case No. 2:07-cv-359-CW-PMW

TROY MICHAEL KELL,
Petitioner,

Petitioner’s Motion to Stay Federal
Habeas Proceedings

v.
Death Penalty Case
SCOTT CROWTHER, Warden of the
Utah State Prison,
Honorable Judge Clark Waddoups
Respondent.
Petitioner Troy Michael Kell, through counsel, respectfully moves this Court
to stay his federal habeas proceedings and to authorize the Federal Public Defender
of the District of Arizona to represent Mr. Kell in state-court post-conviction
proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e) (directing that appointed counsel “shall”
provide representation in ancillary matters and subsequent stages of available
judicial proceedings). Mr. Kell previously sought permission to file a motion to
1
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stay prior to the Court holding oral argument on August 11, 2017. (See ECF No.
241.) At the oral argument on his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(see ECF No. 243), counsel provided further information as to why a stay was
necessary and appropriate to allow Mr. Kell to exhaust previously unexhausted
claims, specifically Claims 3(D) and 3(F) from his Amended Petition, pursuant to
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005). Mr. Kell now files his formal motion
to stay his federal habeas proceedings to allow Mr. Kell to return to state court to
properly exhaust these claims.
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Troy Michael Kell initiated these federal habeas proceedings
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, et seq., to seek relief from his state-court convictions
and death sentence. This Court appointed the Federal Public Defender of the
District of Arizona to represent Mr. Kell in these proceedings, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3599 and other applicable authority. (ECF No. 33.) Mr. Kell’s habeas
petition is pending before this Court and briefing on his Motion for Discovery has
concluded. Pursuant to the Order entered in this Court on May 26, 2015 detailing
the schedule for litigation of non-hearing issues (ECF No. 97), Mr. Kell now
requests the Federal Public Defender be authorized to represent him in related
state-court post-conviction proceedings.

2
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In such proceedings, Mr. Kell will first assert that his right to a fair and
impartial jury were violated as a result of extraneous influences on the jurors in his
case, specifically, when two jurors ignored the trial court’s instructions not to
discuss the case outside of deliberations and engaged in conversations about the
case during their carpool to and from the trial and because the Central Utah
Correctional Facility (“CUCF”) staff conveyed their desire for Mr. Kell to receive
a death sentence to the jurors. Second, Mr. Kell will argue that his constitutional
rights were violated during his state court sentencing proceeding when the trial
court gave an unconstitutional jury instruction that impermissibly shifted the
burden of proof with regard to sentencing outside of the presence of Mr. Kell and
his counsel and without a court reporter present. Mr. Kell further requests a stay
and abeyance of his federal proceedings for the duration of the state-court
proceedings.
I.

BACKGROUND
On August 1, 1996, Mr. Kell was sentenced to death in the Sixth District

Court of Sanpete County, Utah. Mr. Kell’s direct appeal was denied on November
1, 2002. State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019 (Utah 2002). Attorney Michael Esplin was
initially appointed to represent Mr. Kell in his state post-conviction proceedings
and filed a Preliminary Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the state district court
on May 16, 2003. (PCR ROA 1-5a.) Subsequently, Mr. Esplin withdrew and
3
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attorneys Aric Cramer and William Morrison were appointed (PCR ROA 42-43,
54-55.) Cramer and Morrison filed an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief on August 1, 2005. (PCR ROA 0252-0272.) The petition was only 21 pages
in length, contained only one case citation, and appended no declarations or other
new evidence. The state moved to dismiss on December 2, 2012. (PCR ROA 02900293.) The state court granted the motion to dismiss on January 23, 2007 and the
Utah Supreme Court affirmed on September 5, 2008. Kell v. State, 194 P.3d 913
(Utah 2008).
On January 13, 2009, Mr. Kell filed a pro se Motion for Relief Pursuant to
Utah Rule 60(b) in the state court. (PCR ROA 0684-0851.) In his Rule 60(b)
motion, Mr. Kell alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in
his post-conviction proceedings because counsel had failed to investigate and
failed to raise many meritorious claims. Four months later, on May 27, 2009,
federal habeas counsel filed an Initial Petition in Mr. Kell’s federal habeas case.
(ECF No. 36.) On June 12, 2009, counsel filed a Motion to Stay Federal Habeas
Proceedings and asked that a stay be granted in Mr. Kell’s federal case to resolve
previously-pending state-court litigation. (ECF Nos. 40, 41.) In its order on Mr.
Kell’s Motion to Stay, this Court noted that Mr. Kell had filed a “protective federal
habeas petition,” despite still-pending state court litigation, in order to ensure
compliance with the AEDPA statute of limitations. (ECF No. 51.)
4
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The Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion on the Rule 60(b) appeal on May
4, 2012. Rehearing was denied on August 29, 2012 and the case was remitted on
September 24, 2012. Mr. Kell filed his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus in this Court on January 14, 2013. (ECF No. 94.) In his Amended Petition,
Mr. Kell included for the first time Claims 3(D) and 3(F), both of which allege
extraneous influence on jurors. (ECF No. 94 at 33-35, 36-40.) These claims were
supported by declarations from jurors that were signed in May 2012, after the Utah
Supreme Court had issued its opinion denying Mr. Kell’s Rule 60(b) motion. (See
ECF No. 94 Exs. 1, 3, 4, 5, 10, and 11.) Mr. Kell raised these claims in his
Amended Petition in this Court, the next available opportunity after the denial of
his Rule 60(b) motion in the state court.
II.

ARGUMENT
Mr. Kell requests a temporary stay and abeyance while he pursues his claims

under Rule 32 in state court. See Fairchild v. Workman, 579 F.3d 1134, 1156 (10th
Cir. 2009) (a district court may stay a mixed petition and hold it in abeyance while
the petitioner returns to state court); see also Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624
(9th Cir. 2005) (a federal court can “deny relief on the merits of an unexhausted
claim only when it is perfectly clear that the petitioner has no chance of obtaining
relief”). This Court retains the discretion to stay federal proceedings, even in cases
affected by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
5
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Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. at 276. In Rhines, the United States Supreme Court held
that a federal district court should stay a “mixed” federal habeas petition, that is
one containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, if the petitioner has good
cause for his failure to exhaust all claims, his unexhausted claims are potentially
meritorious, and there is no indication that petitioner engaged in intentionally
dilatory litigation tactics. See id. at 271-72, 278. To this end, the Court stated that it
would be an “abuse of discretion” to deny a stay and dismiss a mixed petition.
A. The Rhines “Good Cause” Standard
Although the United States Supreme Court has not clearly defined the “good
cause” standard under Rhines, their cases indicate that the good cause standard is
less stringent than the cause required to excuse procedural default. This conclusion
is supported by the Supreme Court’s holding in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408
(2005), in which the Court stated that a petitioner’s “reasonable confusion” about
the timeliness of his state habeas petition would satisfy “good cause” under Rhines.
Id. at 416. Because the United States Supreme Court affirmed that good cause
under Rhines could be satisfied by a petitioner’s “reasonable confusion” about
timeliness, which would not constitute cause to excuse procedural default, the good
cause standard in Rhines cannot be equivalent to the procedural default rules.
Moreover, nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision indicates that the Court
intended for good cause under Rhines to be equivalent to the cause required to
6
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excuse procedural default. When the Court decided Rhines, the procedural default
doctrine was well established, and the Court had defined “cause” in the context of
procedural default doctrine. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 744-51
(1991) (discussing the development of the cause and prejudice standard,
confirming that the cause and prejudice standard governs, and abrogating the
deliberate bypass standard applied in previous cases). Notably, the Court in Rhines
did not once cite to any of its longstanding precedent regarding the cause required
to excuse procedural default.
Here, the ineffective assistance of Mr. Kell’s state post-conviction counsel
can satisfy the “good cause” requirement under Rhines. District courts have long
held that ineffective assistance of appellate and state habeas counsel can satisfy the
good cause standard under Rhines. See, e.g., Abel v. Chavez, No. 2:11-cv-00721GEB-GGH, 2011 WL 4928689 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2011) (ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel satisfies good cause); Rankin v. Norris, No. 5:06-cv-00228-JM,
2009 WL 1973475 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 2009) (ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel provides good cause); Rhines v. Weber, 408 F. Supp. 2d 844,
848 (D. S.D. 2005) (same); Martin v. Warren, No. 2:05-cv-71849-VAR-WC, 2005
WL 2173365, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2005) (ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel satisfies good cause standard); Brown v. Neven, No. 2:11-cv-00790-KJDNJK, 2013 WL 321691, at *5 (D. Nev. Jan. 25, 2013) (finding good cause where
7
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claims were unexhausted because post-conviction counsel failed to include claims
in initial state post-conviction pleading); see also Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977,
983-84 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “good cause under Rhines, when based on
[ineffective assistance of counsel], cannot be any more demanding than a showing
of cause under Martinez to excuse procedural fault” and noting that there is a lesser
burden on the petitioner because a “showing of good cause under Rhines only
permits a petitioner to return to state court—not bypass the state court” entirely);
Byford v. Baker, No. 3:11-cv-00112-JCM-WGC, 2013 WL 431340, at *4-5 (D.
Nev. Feb. 1, 2013) (in light of Martinez, finding that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel constitutes good cause for a stay under Rhines); Hreniuk v.
Balicki, No. 3:11-cv-00052-MLC, 2013 WL 1187107, at *2 (D. N.J. Mar. 21,
2013) (in light of Martinez, finding good cause for a stay where deficient postconviction attorney failed to develop state evidentiary record); Brown, 2013 WL
321691, at *4 (Martinez supported finding of good cause for a stay).
B. The Rhines “Potentially Meritorious” Standard Requires only that
Mr. Kell Present a Colorable Federal Claim
The “potentially meritorious” inquiry set forth in Rhines requires nothing
more than a showing that the petitioner has stated a colorable federal claim. In
Rhines, the Court referred to a potentially meritorious claim as one that is not
“plainly meritless.” See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. The Rhines court also compared
the “potentially meritorious” standard to the inquiry under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
8
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See id.; see also Allen v. Zavaras, 568 F.3d 1197, 1201 n.7 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting
that under Rhines a stay may be granted “where the unexhausted claims are not
‘plainly meritless’” (quoting Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277)).
C. Mr. Kell’s Claims are Potentially Meritorious and there is Good
Cause for a Stay
Mr. Kell requests that this Court authorize the Federal Public Defender to
represent him in state-court proceedings regarding the impact of several juror
misconduct issues on his case, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104. § 78B-9104(1)(e) provides relief when “newly discovered material evidence exists that
requires the court to vacate the conviction or sentence.” Several issues reported by
the jurors in their declarations rise to the level of such material evidence and Mr.
Kell can state a colorable claim for relief. These issues are raised in Mr. Kell’s
amended habeas petition as Claims 3(D) and 3(F), but Mr. Kell concedes they were
not raised in state court as a result of the ineffectiveness of Mr. Kell’s postconviction counsel. (ECF No. 94 at 33-35 and 36-40); see also Martinez v. Ryan,
566 U.S. 1 (2012). Furthermore, Mr. Kell may show good cause for failing to raise
these claims in state court on the basis that these claims were based on new facts
not known at the time of his post-conviction petition and that these claims have not
been withheld for tactical reasons. See, e.g., United States v. Silva-Arzeta, 602 F.3d
1208, 1218-19 (2010); Taylor v. State, 270 P.3d 471 (Utah 2012).

9
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1.

Jurors Violated the Instructions of the Court and Participated in
Conversations about the Trial Outside of Deliberations (Claim
3(D))

Mr. Kell’s rights to a fair and impartial jury were violated when the jurors
considered extraneous information and failed to adhere to the court’s instructions
regarding their discussion of matters presented at trial. See generally Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992); McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548 (1984). Nonetheless, investigations into this claim revealed that the
jury deliberations were impacted by two sources of extraneous information:
discussions between two jurors regarding the content of the trial while the trial was
still in progress, and communications to the jurors from CUCF staff regarding their
opinions on the appropriate outcome for the trial and dangerousness of Mr. Kell.
(See ECF No. 94 Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4.)
The jurors swore an oath to follow the instructions of the court. “We
presume jurors will remain true to their oath and conscientiously follow the trial
court’s instructions. The entire weight of our legal system rests upon the shoulders
of the jurors.” United States v. Carter, 973 F.2d 1509, 1513-14 (10th Cir. 1992)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Jurors who disregard their oaths and
disobey the instructions of the court threaten the integrity of both the verdict they
return and the legitimacy of the justice system as a whole.

10
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In Mr. Kell’s case, Jury Instruction 5 specifically prohibited jurors from
speaking about the case during any recess, even with each other. (ROA 2234.)
Nevertheless, two jurors carpooled together to and from the trial and
acknowledged that, during their drives, they discussed the content of the trial and
how it was giving them nightmares. (See Exhibits 1 and 2.) These discussions took
place prior to deliberations and outside of the presence of the other jurors. As a
result, these conversations were in violation of the instructions the jurors were
given repeatedly throughout the trial that prohibited them from discussing any
aspect of the case with anyone, including each other, prior to deliberations.
Additionally, staff members at CUCF, a significant employer in the small
community of Sanpete County, communicated to the jurors their opinions
regarding the appropriate outcome and sentence for the trial. One juror stated that
“there was also community pressure to sentence Kell to death. I knew people who
worked at the prison. When I would enter the prison, I understood the sentiment
for a death sentence was strong among the prison guards that I passed. All of the
prison guards wanted the death sentence. All of them.” (ECF No. 94 Ex. 3.) This
message regarding the staff sentiment on Mr. Kell’s sentencing and dangerousness
was also communicated to the jurors overtly. Specifically, “Deputies escorted us to
our vehicles because they were afraid somebody might retaliate against us. I guess
they thought we might be sniped or something.” (ECF No. 94 Ex. 4.) This
11
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messaging, coming from agents of the prison, had a tremendous potential to
prejudice the jury against Mr. Kell and to influence their determination of the
appropriate sentence in his case. As a result, Mr. Kell was denied due process at
his capital-sentencing proceeding and he has a colorable claim for state-court
relief.
During state post-conviction proceedings, counsel failed to conduct any
investigation, including speaking with jurors, and thus were not aware of this claim
and failed to present it to the state court. (ECF No. 94 Ex. 15 at ¶¶ 3, 4, 12, 14.)
This failure on the part of post-conviction counsel was unreasonable under
prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688. State
post-conviction counsel’s deficient performance constitutes cause under Rhines.
2.

The Trial Court Committed Prejudicial Error when it gave an
Unconstitutional Supplemental Jury Instruction and, thereby,
Shifted the Burden of Proof (Claim 3(F))

Mr. Kell’s rights to due process were violated when the trial court gave the
jurors an unconstitutional jury instruction, outside of the presence of Mr. Kell and
his counsel, which shifted the burden of proof in the sentencing determination. In a
death penalty case, each phase of the proceedings must “satisfy the requirements of
the Due Process Clause.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). One of
those requirements is that the jury make each determination at each phase based on
the evidence presented. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520 (1979); see
12
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also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980). An erroneous jury instruction
infringes upon this right if “the jury was misled on the applicable law.” Smith v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000). When there exists a
reasonable likelihood that the jury relied on an unconstitutional understanding of
the law in reaching a guilty verdict, that verdict must be set aside. See Boyde v.
California, 494 U.S. 370, 379-80 (1990).
In order for a jury to impose a capital sentence, it is incumbent on the State
to prove the existence of any fact which they have alleged in justification of
increasing the presumed punishment from life in prison to that of death. See Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). Thus, the burden is on the prosecution to
prove that death is the appropriate punishment and a jury must be properly
instructed where that burden lies. Id.
The judge is “the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper
conduct and of determining questions of law.” Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S.
466, 469 (1933). “[T]he influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and
properly of great weight, and … his lightest word or intimation is received with
deference, and may prove controlling.” Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626
(1894). “The judge’s last word is apt to be the decisive word.” Bollenbach v.
United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946). Given “the place of importance that trial
by jury has in our Bill of Rights,” it is incumbent upon our courts to protect
13
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“ascertainment of guilt by a jury under appropriate judicial guidance, however
cumbersome that process may be.” Id. at 615. This is one of those “basic principles
of justice” that requires “strict adherence.” State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 80 (Utah
1982). It is a principle that must be adhered to in order to “satisfy the requirements
of the Due Process Clause.” Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358.
In Mr. Kell’s case, the trial judge violated these principles and Mr. Kell’s
due process rights by giving the jury an unconstitutional instruction, outside of the
presence of Mr. Kell and his counsel and off the record. Three jurors specifically
recall the judge providing clarification for them on a point of law during their
sentencing deliberations. (See ECF No. 94 Ex. 2, 5, 6.) Specifically, one juror
recalled that
I had a difficult time voting for the death penalty but I agreed to do so
after Judge Mower came and spoke to the jurors as we deliberated. He
told us that Kell’s attorneys had to show us that Kell’s life should be
spared. The jury had bogged down over a definition but the judge’s
statement helped because we wanted to be sure that we were doing the
right thing. I remember that the judge was asked a question while he
was speaking to us, and he kidded around and said he couldn’t address
that question, and said that it was up to us. After the judge came and
spoke to us, I felt more comfortable voting for death.
(ECF No. 94 at Ex. 2 at ¶ 2.) That same juror also recalled that “[t]here was no
defense attorney present when the judge spoke to us during deliberations, though
there was somebody with him.” Id. at ¶ 3. There is no indication from the trial

14
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transcript of a question from the jury after the beginning of the guilt or penalty
deliberations. (ROA at 5464-5467, 5735-5737, 5742.)
The trial judge’s instruction to the jury tainted the deliberation process and
unconstitutionally shifted the burden to Mr. Kell to prove that his life should be
spared. The judge’s actions also violated the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
This error was a prejudicial error of constitutional magnitude, requiring reversal.
As a result, this unconstitutional jury instruction violated Mr. Kell’s constitutional
rights and he has a colorable claim for state-court relief.
Counsel in state habeas proceedings failed to raise these claims to the state
court. As a result, Mr. Kell has been denied the opportunity to have these
significant claims reviewed by the state court. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 10
(“When an attorney errs in initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that no
state court at any level will hear the prisoner’s claim.”). Furthermore, counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings admitted that he was unaware of this issue
because he failed to speak with any of the jurors, and there was no strategic reason
for his failure. (ECF No. 94 Ex. 15 at ¶¶ 3, 4, 12, 14.) Counsel’s failure to raise
these potentially meritorious claims constitutes good cause under Rhines. This
Court should grant Mr. Kell a stay to return to state court to exhaust these claims.

15
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D. Mr. Kell has not Engaged in Intentionally Dilatory Litigation Tactics
Mr. Kell satisfies the Rhines requirement that he has not engaged in
intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Mr. Kell discovered the factual basis of
these claims in May 2012, and included the claims in his Amended Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus, which was filed on January 14, 2013. (ECF No. 94.) The
factual support for these claims was uncovered at approximately the same time that
the Utah Supreme Court denied Mr. Kell’s rule 60(b) motion. Thus, there was not
an appropriate opportunity to present new claims and new evidence to the state
court prior to the filing of Mr. Kell’s Amended Petition in this Court. In his
Amended Petition, Mr. Kell noted that he would be filing a motion for a stay
pursuant to Rhines at the appropriate time. (See ECF No. 94 at 11; ECF No. 115 at
44, 50, 201.) As discussed above, Mr. Kell has complied with the requirements of
the Case Management Schedule (ECF No. 97) as agreed to by the parties and
ordered by the Court. As contemplated by the Case Management Schedule,
litigation over discovery and an evidentiary hearing began in early 2014 and
continued until June 2017. Thus, as agreed by the parties, now is the appropriate
time to address a motion for a stay. (See ECF No. 97.)
III.

Appointment of the Federal Public Defender
This Court should allow the Federal Public Defender of the District of

Arizona to represent Mr. Kell in the ancillary state-court litigation described above.
16
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This Court has the authority to permit the Federal Public Defender to represent Mr.
Kell as he litigates his successive petition for post-conviction relief in state court.
In addition, a number of considerations warrant the exercise of such authority.
A. This Court may authorize the Federal Public Defender to represent
Mr. Kell in state court
The Criminal Justice Act provides for appointed federal counsel to represent
a party in “ancillary matters appropriate to the proceedings.” 18 U.S.C. §
3006A(c). In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) states as follows:
In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of title
28, United States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death
sentence, any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to
obtain adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other
reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment of
one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other services in
accordance with subsections (b) through (f).
18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2). Subsection (e), which governs the scope of federally
appointed counsel’s duties, provides in turn that federally appointed counsel
shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent stage of
available judicial proceedings, including pretrial proceedings, trial,
sentencing, motions for new trial, appeals, applications for writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, and all available
post-conviction process, together with applications for stays of
execution and other appropriate motions and procedures, and shall
also represent the defendant in such competency proceedings and
proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to
the defendant.
18 U.S.C. § 3599(e).
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In Harbison v. Bell, the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3599 vests
district courts with discretion to permit federally appointed counsel to represent
their clients in state clemency proceedings, as well as “other appropriate motions
and procedures.” 556 U.S. 180, 190 n.7 (2009). Harbison involved a
“straightforward reading” of § 3599(e). Id. at 185. The Court found that the broad
language in § 3599(e) “hardly suggests a limitation on the scope of representation.”
Id. at 188. Any limitation on federally appointed counsel “follows from the word
‘subsequent’ and the organization of subsection (e),” which mirrors “the ordinary
course of proceedings for capital defendants.” Id. Therefore, once federally funded
counsel is appointed to represent a state prisoner in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceedings,
the duties enumerated in § 3599(e) authorize that same counsel to represent the
prisoner in all available and subsequent judicial proceedings. It is the term
“subsequent” that circumscribes counsel’s representation, “not a strict division
between federal and state proceedings.” Id. Accordingly, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c)
and 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2), along with Harbison, authorize this Court to allow Mr.
Kell’s federal counsel to litigate state-court matters.
Moreover, this Court has often authorized federal habeas counsel to
represent clients in state-court post-conviction proceedings, clemency litigation
and other ancillary proceedings, including previously in this case. (See ECF No.
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51; see also Menzies v. Friel, 03-CV-00902-JC-KBM (D. Utah Oct. 27, 2004),
ECF No. 41 (granting a stay pending conclusion of Rule 60(b) proceedings).)
B. This Court should authorize the Federal Public Defender to
represent Mr. Kell in state court for multiple reasons
Several considerations justify allowing the Federal Public Defender—
undersigned counsel—to represent Mr. Kell in ancillary state-court litigation. First,
allowing counsel to represent Mr. Kell serves the related ends of judicial economy
and the avoidance of delay. Counsel have already invested large amounts of time
learning the record in Mr. Kell’s case and researching the applicable case law.
Accordingly, counsel are prepared to initiate state-court proceedings as
expeditiously as possible. Were this Court to deny counsel permission to represent
Mr. Kell in state court, new counsel would need to be appointed and would be
required to expend a tremendous amount of resources, including funding and time,
which would lead to a marked delay in state-court litigation.1
Second, counsel have the experience necessary to pursue the state-court
litigation described above. Such experience is particularly critical in light of the
probability that the claims Mr. Kell expects to raise in his successive petition for
post-conviction relief will be considered on the merits. Having experienced capital
counsel will benefit Mr. Kell in state-court proceedings and will potentially have
1

Because Mr. Kell has alleged in federal court that his prior state post-conviction
counsel provided ineffective assistance, that prior counsel cannot resume
representation.
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collateral benefits for federal proceedings. Third, undersigned counsel have
developed an attorney-client relationship of trust with Mr. Kell, and permitting
counsel to represent Mr. Kell in state court continues this relationship and avoids
potential interference with it. Finally, such authorization avoids any possibility that
newly appointed counsel will adopt strategies that conflict with those of federal
habeas counsel, resulting in future problems and potential legal conflicts.
Consequently, this Court can and should allow the Federal Public Defender
to represent Mr. Kell in ancillary state-court litigation, as it has done in comparable
cases. See, e.g., Menzies v. Friel, 03-CV00902-JC-KBM (D. Utah Oct. 27, 2004),
ECF No. 41 (granting a stay pending conclusion of Rule 60(b) proceedings).)
IV.

A Temporary Stay and Abeyance is in the Interest of Comity and
Judicial Economy
A limited stay in this case serves interests advanced by AEDPA—comity

and judicial economy—without unduly delaying proceedings. First a stay would
allow state courts to decide issues, for example issues based on newly developed
evidence. See, e.g., Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276-77 (noting that AEDPA “encourages”
petitioners to raise claims in state court before raising them in federal court).
Second, a stay promotes judicial economy by avoiding parallel proceedings in state
and federal court, including litigation of related issues. Certainly the introduction
of evidence into the state-court record would affect Mr. Kell’s habeas proceedings.
Moreover, any state-court relief could moot some of the claims concerning
20
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sentencing that are currently pending before this Court. Consequently, this Court
should temporarily stay federal habeas proceedings to allow Mr. Kell to litigate
these meritorious claims—claims which he had no opportunity to raise earlier—in
state court.
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Kell respectfully requests this Court to

grant a limited stay and hold his federal habeas proceedings in abeyance while Mr.
Kell exhausts claims that were not previously presented to the state court. Further,
Mr. Kell asks the Court to authorize the Federal Public Defender of the District of
Arizona to represent him in state-court proceedings related to these claims of
newly discovered evidence that was not previously raised in his state-court
proceedings. In the alternative, Mr. Kell requests this Court stay federal
proceedings only with respect to Claims 3(D) and 3(F) of his Amended Petition so
that he may properly exhaust those claims in the state court.
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of August, 2017.
Jon M. Sands
Federal Public Defender
/s/ Lindsey Layer
Lindsey Layer
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Attorney for Petitioner Kell
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of August, 2017, I electronically filed
the foregoing document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF system which
sent notification of such filing to the following registrants:

/s/ Daniel Juarez
Assistant Paralegal
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Petitioner Troy Michael Kell, through counsel, submits his Reply in Support of Motion to
Stay Federal Habeas Proceedings. As demonstrated below, Respondent’s arguments as to why this
Court should not grant a stay pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), are unavailing.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Although counsel was appointed on May 31, 2007, see ECF No. 3, state post-conviction

proceedings were still ongoing at that time, see ECF No. 1 at 2. The Utah Supreme Court denied
the appeal of Mr. Kell’s petition for post-conviction review on September 5, 2008, Kell v. State,
194 P.3d 913 (Utah 2003), and Mr. Kell filed a pro se motion for relief pursuant to Utah Rule 60(b)
on January 13, 2009, PCR ROA 684-751. Mr. Kell filed an initial petition for writ of habeas corpus
in this Court on May 27, 2009, ECF No. 36, and a motion to stay federal proceedings to allow state
court litigation to resolve was filed on June 12, 2009, ECF Nos. 40, 41. In its order on Mr. Kell’s
motion to stay the federal proceedings, this Court noted that Mr. Kell had filed a “protective federal
habeas petition,” despite the pendency of litigation in state court, in order to ensure compliance
with the AEDPA statute of limitations. ECF No. 51 at 3. The case was then stayed for
approximately three years while proceedings in state court were ongoing. Although it is true that
counsel was initially appointed in 2007, federal proceedings could not go forward because state
court proceedings were still ongoing from that time until late 2012. Thus, although perhaps
technically correct, it is misleading to assert that Mr. Kell’s case has been “pending” in this Court
for ten years. See ECF No. 247 at 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 25, 26.
Mr. Kell filed his Amended Petition on January 14, 2013. ECF No. 94. Two months later
the stipulated Case Management Schedule was entered in which the parties agreed to address
discovery and an evidentiary hearing prior to addressing other issues. ECF No. 97. Motions related
to discovery and an evidentiary hearing were resolved on June 23, 2017. ECF No. 238.

1
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II.

MR. KELL HAS SATISFIED THE RHINES STANDARD
Under Rhines, a district court should stay proceedings to allow a petitioner to return to state

court when the petitioner has “good cause” for his failure to exhaust a claim, the claim is not
“plainly meritless,” and the petitioner has not engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.
Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. Mr. Kell has satisfied each of these requirements.
A. Mr. Kell has Satisfied the “Good Cause” Requirement under Rhines
Respondents contend that in order to satisfy the “good cause” requirement under Rhines
“[Mr.] Kell must establish ‘cause’ equivalent to that which would excuse a procedural default.”
ECF No. 247 at 9 (citing Carter v. Friel, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1319 (D. Utah 2006) and
Hernandez v. Sullivan, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2005)). As Mr. Kell argued in his
motion, the weight of authority is against Respondent’s argument. ECF No. 245 at 6-8.
Furthermore, two Utah District Court judges have recently followed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
in Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2014), and held that the Rhines good cause
standard is a lesser burden than that required to excuse procedural default. See Order, Lafferty v.
Crowther, 2:07-cv-00322-DB, ECF No. 379 at 7-8 (D. Utah Oct. 30, 2015) (“[T]he court finds the
analysis of Blake and Rhines II to be better reasoned than the analysis followed by Hernandez and
Carter.”); Order, Archuleta v. Crowther, 2:07-cv-00630-TC, ECF No. 107 at 9-10 (D. Utah Nov.
12, 2014) (same). These judges also rejected Respondent’s contention that ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel does not constitute “good cause” under Rhines. Id.; see also ECF No.
245 at 6-8. 1

1

The cases relied on by Respondent, Carter and Hernandez, were decided several years before
the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez, and thus did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s
analysis in that case. But see Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2014) (addressing the
Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez and its relation to the Rhines “good cause” standard).
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Respondent further contends that because Mr. Kell’s unexhausted claims are not based on
the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, “Martinez’s exception is thus unavailable to [Mr.] Kell.”
ECF No. 247 at 12. This statement misunderstands Mr. Kell’s argument and the standard at issue.
Under Martinez, the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may constitute cause
regarding a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the context of a procedural default.
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012). Whether there is “good cause” under Rhines is a distinct
issue from whether there is cause to excuse a procedural default. Blake, 745 F.3d at 983-84. There
is no indication that any court has ever limited the availability of a Rhines stay to a particular type
of claim.
Respondent also argues that in order to established good cause based on post-conviction
counsel’s ineffective assistance, Mr. Kell must “affirmatively prove” that counsel was ineffective
under Strickland v. Washington. ECF No. 247 at 12. There is no authority that supports
Respondent’s argument. In Blake, the Ninth Circuit stated, “While a bald assertion [of ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel] cannot amount to a showing of good cause, a reasonable
excuse, supported by evidence to justify a petitioner’s failure to exhaust, will.” Blake, 745 F.3d at
982. This is a significantly lesser showing than that required to obtain relief under Strickland.
Furthermore, Respondent argues that Mr. Kell cannot establish that post-conviction
counsel’s performance was deficient unless he can establish that counsel had “reason to think
[jurors’] deliberations had been extraneously influenced.” ECF No. 247 at 13. This argument
ignores the fact that the only way counsel could have established reason to believe jurors’
deliberations had been extraneously influenced would be by speaking with the jurors. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that a decision to cease investigation must itself be based on a reasonable
investigation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000);

3
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Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533-34 (2003); see also ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 10.15.1(C), (E)(4) and commentary (2003)
(“[C]ollateral counsel cannot rely on the previously compiled record but must conduct a thorough,
independent investigation” because “the trial record is unlikely to provide either a complete or
accurate picture of the facts and issues in the case.”). Post-conviction counsel cannot have made a
reasonable strategic decision to limit investigation of jurors because counsel had not conducted
any investigation at all. As argued in Mr. Kell’s Amended Petition, Reply, and Motion for a Stay,
post-conviction counsel filed a petition that was perfunctory at best, failed to conduct even a
cursory investigation of the case, including failing to interview even a single juror, and admitted
that none of these decisions were strategic. See ECF No. 94 at 150-51, 156-60; ECF No. 94-1 Ex.
15; ECF No. 115 at 180-85; ECF No. 115-1 Ex. 1 at ¶6; ECF No. 245 at 12, 15. There is no
question that post-conviction counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland, and therefore
also under the lower Rhines standard.
B. Mr. Kell’s Claims are Potentially Meritorious
1.

The Potential Application of a State Procedural Bar is Not an Appropriate
Consideration Under Rhines

A petitioner satisfies the Rhines standard for a stay if he has good cause for his failure to
exhaust, the unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and the petitioner did not engage in
intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 271-72, 278. The federal court’s
determination of whether to grant a stay under Rhines is limited to these three factors. Id. The
possibility of the application of a state procedural bar has no bearing on any of the factors in Rhines
and is therefore not relevant to this Court’s determination whether to grant a stay.
Whether a state procedural rule could potentially bar a claim is clearly not relevant to
whether Mr. Kell has established “good cause” or whether he has engaged in “intentionally dilatory

4
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litigation tactics.” Both inquiries are based on the actions of the petitioner and the reasons he has
not previously exhausted his claims. See, e.g., Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005) (a
petitioner’s “reasonable confusion” about whether a filing would be timely constitutes good cause
under Rhines).
State procedural rules are similarly irrelevant to the “potentially meritorious” inquiry. The
“potentially meritorious” analysis requires only that a petitioner demonstrate that the substance of
the claim is not “plainly meritless.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78; see also Cassett v. Stewart, 406
F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (a federal court may “deny an unexhausted petition on the merits
only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim”).
Another court in this district recently agreed that Respondent’s argument was misplaced, stating,
“The Utah Supreme Court may agree with [Respondent’s] position. It may not. But this court finds
that the interests in federalism and comity require that the state courts have the opportunity to make
that decision.” Order, Archuleta, 2:07-cv-00630-TC, ECF No. 107 at 15 (D. Utah Nov. 12, 2014);
see also Fairchild v. Workman, 579 F.3d 1134, 1153 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that if the state court
resolves the claim on the merits, AEDPA deference would then apply in federal court and if the
state court resolves the claim on a procedural ground “the federal court will review that disposition,
applying the standard of review that is appropriate under the circumstances”). Thus, whether a
state procedural bar may or may not be applicable to a state petitioner’s claims is not an appropriate
element of a district court’s determination of whether a stay is appropriate under Rhines. 2
In the alternative, were this Court to hold that Mr. Kell’s claims were barred by state

2

Respondent argues that “[Mr.] Kell ‘is not eligible for relief under’ the PCRA because the claims
are ‘barred by the limitation period.’” ECF No. 247 at 16 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)),
17-18. Subsection (3) allows a petitioner to seek relief when the ground for relief could have been
raised earlier if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(3).
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procedural rules, Mr. Kell’s claims would then be technically exhausted but procedurally
defaulted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2006); Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state
court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer
‘available’ to him” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 125-26, n. 28
(1982))); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (“The requisite exhaustion may nonetheless
exist . . . if it is clear that respondent’s claims are now procedurally barred under [state] law.”
(citations omitted)). Should this Court so decide, Mr. Kell requests the opportunity to brief the
adequacy and independence of the state procedural bar and the existence of any excuse to the
procedural default.
2.

Claims 3(D) and 3(F) are Potentially Meritorious

Respondent contends that Claims 3(D) and 3(F) are meritless because the evidence on
which the claims are based is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). ECF No. 247
at 18-20. Respondent is incorrect for several reasons. First, by the plain language of Rule
606(b)(1), a juror “may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the
jury’s deliberations[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1) (emphasis added). Claim 3(D) addresses
extraneous influences and juror discussions of the case prior to deliberations. Second, Rule
606(b)(2) provides exceptions where “(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any
juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.” Fed. R. Evid.
606(b)(2). Claims 3(D)—that jurors improperly discussed the case prior to deliberations and were
improperly influenced by guards at the prison who were also responsible for jurors’ safety during
the trial—and 3(F)—that the trial judge gave a supplemental instruction during jurors’ penalty
phase deliberations outside the presence of the defendant or his attorneys—plainly fall under the

6
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exceptions in subsections (A) and (B). Third, the Supreme Court recently made clear that there
may be instances where “the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way”
when jurors’ statements “cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s
deliberations and resulting verdict.” Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
Although the Court in Pena-Rodriguez addressed racial bias in jury deliberations, the Court made
clear that its holding was not limited to only that circumstance. See id. at 871.
Respondent’s argument that Claims 3(D) and 3(F) do not state constitutional violations is
also without merit. The Supreme Court has made clear that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause requires that defendants be tried by a fair, impartial, and indifferent panel of jurors.
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 726-27 (1992); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-72
(1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961). With respect to Claim 3(D), Respondent takes
issue with the details of Mr. Kell’s evidence in support of his claim. See ECF No. 247 at 21.
Respondent’s argument is insufficient to demonstrate the claim is “plainly meritless.” Rhines, 544
U.S. at 277; see also Allen v. Zavaras, 568 F.3d 1197, 1201 n.7 (10th Cir. 2009); Cassett, 406 F.3d
at 624.
With respect to Claim 3(F), Respondent alleges that Mr. Kell “necessarily had to point to
at least some mitigation evidence” in order to convince jurors not to vote for death in the penalty
phase, and therefore Mr. Kell’s claim must fail. ECF No. 247 at 23-24. This is a misstatement of
both constitutional law and the trial court’s instructions themselves. The trial court instructed
jurors: “It is presumed that a person convicted of aggravated murder will be sentenced to life in
prison, unless and until the propriety of the death penalty or life in prison without parol[e] is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. This presumption is not a mere form to be disregarded by the jury at
pleasure, but is a substantial essential part of the law and is binding upon the jury.” Tr. ROA

7
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6/25/1996 at 5686; see also id. at 5686-87 (“The burden of proof necessary for a verdict of death
or for a verdict of life in prison without parole over life in prison in this case is upon the State. . .
You may return a verdict of death only if . . . you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that
the totality of aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of mitigating circumstances”); id.
at 5687, 5688. These instructions comport with Supreme Court precedent that the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances is a finding that must be made beyond a reasonable
doubt by a jury. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589
(2002). Respondent’s argument that Mr. Kell’s claim is not “potentially meritorious” is incorrect.
3.

Claim 3(F) is Not Time Barred

Respondents contend that claim 3(F) is “plainly meritless” because it is time-barred in
federal court. ECF No. 247 at 14. Respondent is incorrect. In his original Petition, filed in 2009,
Mr. Kell raised a claim that he was “Denied his Right to a Fair and Impartial Jury in Violation of
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” ECF No. 36 at 25.
Subclaim D further alleged that jurors “considered extraneous information during deliberations.”
Id. at 29. In order to comply with the one-year time limit under AEDPA, a new claim must “relate
back” to a timely filed petition. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005). A new claim will not
relate back “when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and
type from those the original pleading set forth.” Id. Here, Mr. Kell alleged in his initial Petition
that jurors considered extraneous information during deliberations. The additional allegation in his
Amended Petition that among the extraneous information jurors considered was a supplemental
instruction from the trial court given outside the presence of the defendant or counsel does not
“differ in both time and type” from the original pleading. Because the claim relates back to the
initial Petition, it is not barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations.
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C. Mr. Kell has Not Engaged in Intentionally Dilatory Litigation Tactics
Respondent’s principal argument that Mr. Kell has been dilatory is that “[Mr.] Kell did not
need this Court’s permission to file a successive petition in state court” and “could have filed a
successive petition in state court concurrent with his amended federal habeas petition . . . or at any
time since then.” ECF No. 247 at 25. Respondent essentially faults Mr. Kell for adhering to the
Case Management Schedule. The Case Management Schedule set out a timeline for responsive
pleadings to the Amended Petition, followed by motions for discovery and an evidentiary hearing.
ECF No. 97. It specifically contemplated that “briefing on any remaining non-hearing issues”
would be addressed after evidentiary issues were addressed and the parties would “work together
to create a briefing schedule.” Id. at 2. The whole point of creating a case management schedule is
to provide for appropriate and predictable timelines on which the parties and the Court can rely to
address relevant motions and other briefing. Respondent now suggests that Mr. Kell was dilatory
because he did not disregard the parties’ stipulation and the Court’s order regarding the briefing
schedule. Mr. Kell cannot be dilatory for adhering to the stipulated Case Management Schedule.
Furthermore, Respondent is incorrect that Mr. Kell did not need permission to file in the
state court. Mr. Kell is represented by the Federal Public Defender, which is overseen by the
Administrative Office of the United State Courts. It has long been the policy that “Defender
Services appropriation funds may not be used to represent an individual under a state-imposed
death sentence in a state proceeding unless a presiding judicial officer in a federal judicial
proceeding involving the individual has determined that such use of Defender Services
appropriation funds is authorized by law.” Report of the Committee on Defender Services to the
Mach 1999 Judicial Conference at 9-10 (March 1999). Thus, Mr. Kell’s attorneys are required to
have permission in order to represent a petitioner in state-court proceedings. See, e.g., Order,
Archuleta, 2:07-cv-00630, ECF No. 107 at 20 (D. Utah Nov. 12, 2014).
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III.

MR. KELL HAS NOT PRESENTED A “MIXED PETITION”
Respondent alleges that Mr. Kell has not moved to exhaust all of the claims in his Amended

Petition that are unexhausted and the Court cannot grant a Rhines motion “while unexhausted
claims remain.” Respondent, however, does not cite a single additional claim that Mr. Kell has
failed to exhaust. This is because there is none. All other claims in the Amended Petition were
raised in state court proceedings and are therefore exhausted. 3
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Respondent’s arguments as to why Mr. Kell should not be

granted a stay are without merit. Mr. Kell respectfully requests this Court to grant a limited stay
and hold his federal habeas proceedings in abeyance while Mr. Kell exhausts claims that were not
previously presented to the state court. Further, Mr. Kell asks the Court to authorize the Federal
Public Defender of the District of Arizona to represent him in state-court proceedings. In the
alternative, Mr. Kell requests this Court stay federal proceedings only with respect to Claims 3(D)
and 3(F) of his Amended Petition so he may properly exhaust those claims in state court.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of September, 2017.

3

In its procedural history section, Respondent states, “[Mr.] Kell moved for discovery to support
ten claims in his petition, including four subclaims that he conceded were unexhausted.” ECF No.
247 at 4. Respondent cites ECF No. 126 at 28, in which he states Petitioner acknowledged claims
15(E), 15(P), 17(B), and 17(C) “were not adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Id. Respondent
confuses exhaustion with procedural default. They are in fact distinct issues. As Respondent
quoted, Mr. Kell conceded the claims “were not adjudicated on the merits in state court.” ECF No.
126 at 28. The claims were, however, presented to the state court in Mr. Kell’s motion pursuant to
Rule 60(b). See PCR ROA 724, 728, 730. They are therefore exhausted, and were found to be
procedurally barred by the state court. See generally Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal
Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, Sixth Edition §§ 23, 26 (Matthew Bender) (2006)
(discussing doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default, respectively).
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Jon M. Sands
Federal Public Defender
/s/ Lindsey Layer
Lindsey Layer
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Attorney for Petitioner Kell
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on this 25th day of September, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF system which sent notification of such filing to
the following registrants:

/s/ Daniel Juarez
Assistant Paralegal
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